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'T,VELF'l'H MEETING.

sides of this proposal with the attention which the subject required, and only because the Italian delegation had the keen desires that the new regulations of international law which would
come forth from this conference should be fully satisfactory to all
those who believed that the world could and must make further
progress on the path of civilization.
The chairman remarked that it being now 1.20 p. m. he would
suggest that the committee adjourn for luncheon and reconvene
at 3 p. !ll· In saying th.~s, however, he did not wish to foreclose
the opportunity for further debate now if anyone desired to say
anything further.
l\1r. Sarraut called attention to the fact that the personnel
both of the French delegation and of the staff of experts accompanying it had been greatly reduced and that with such a short
time between meetings little opportunity was afforded for sending and receiving cables and attending to other such matters.
He therefore requested that the afternoon session should begin
at 3.30 instead of 3 o'clock.
The chairman announced that the meeting would adjourn until
3.30 o'clock.
I

TWELFTH MEETING-THURSDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1921, 3.30 P. M.
PRl<~SENT.

United States.-~Ir. Hughes, l\fr. Root, Senator Underwood,
Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by :Mr. 'Vright,
l\lr. Clark.
Briti8h Entpire.-l\'Ir. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,
Rear Adm~ral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada),
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir Jol1n Salmond (for New
Zealand) , l\fr. Sastri (for India). Acco1npanied by Sir Maurice '
Hankey, Capt. Domville, l\1r. Knowles, Mr. :B-,lint, Mr. Malkin.
France.-"ll1r. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by
l\'Ir. Kammerer, l\1r. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, l\1r. Pensot.
Italy.-Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanie·d by Marquis
Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli,
l\1r. Celesia eli Vegliasco.
Japan.-Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Vice Admiral
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi.
The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Osborne. •
Interpreter, "ll'Ir. Camerlynck.
1. The twelfth meeting of the Committee on d1e Limitation of
Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American
Union Building, at 3.30 p. m., December 29, 1921.
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2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, Mr.
Root, Senator Under~ood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for
the British Empire, ::.\ir. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada),
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, Mr. Sarraut, Vice
Admiral de Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator RolandiRicci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron ' Acton; for Japan,
Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda.
3. Secretaries and advisers present included: For the United
States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Domville, ilir. Kno,vles, Mr. Flint, Mr. ilialkin; for France, Mr. Kammer~r, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal,
1.\-fr. Ponsot; for Italy, lVlarquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano,
Commander Prince Rqspoli, lVlr. Celesia di Vegliasco; for Japan,
Mr. Ichihashi.
The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Osborne,
and Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter, were also present.
The Chairman, Mr. Hughes, said that the committee had before
it the first resolution in regard to submarines.
lVlr. Root. said that he wished to say a few words following Sir
John Salmond's remarks of that morning. He was in full agree
ment with Sir John Salmond's suggestion, and he had no idea of
asking the adoption of the _resolution without the critical examination which carried with it the result of such examination. Mr:
Root believed that the resolutions should go through the process
_ sometimes described by parliamentarians as "perfection by
amendment." Sir John Salmond had made a valuable suggestion
which, embodied in a few words, could but result in the improvement and clarification of the resolution. This ought to be done
and he hoped it )VOuld be done ; whether it was done here by the
members of the committee, speaking upon the advice and experience of their experts, or by a drafting committee of experts
was of little consequence. The great question was whether the
committee would agree to make such a declaration as this. In
any case the process of destructive and constructive criticism
should be gone through.
Mr. Balfour said that, as he understood Mr. Root's proposal, it
was, in British Parliamentary language, to proceed to the second
reading of the resolutions and then to send them to committee.
This phraselogy he understood was not used in this country and he
did not know how far it was employed in the Parliaments of the
other States represented on this committee. Nevertheles.s, it
clearly expressed what Mr. Root proposed, i. e., to put on record
the agreement to the principle of the resolutions and then to pro·
4
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ceed to discuss them in detail. It was an admirable method
and was, he believed, the only way to escape from mix ing up
principles with details. So far as the second reading a spect was
concerned, he believed that the underlying principle had already
been informally approved. Only the formal vote remained to be
registered. His O\Vn view, after listening .to the powerful, persuasive, and impassioned speech of Mr. Root, was ~hat the important
words of the resolutions were the following, at the bottom of
the· first page :
" To the end that there n1ay be a clear public understanding
throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which the
public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future
belligerents.''
That was the central core of the doctrine which Mr. Root had
formulated. lie valued these words partly because they removed
a misconception and partly because they included a positive constructive proposal. The misconception was that the committee was
occupied in an attempt to formulate the full code of maritime law.
If this were the case, not only would it be necessa:ry to weigh and
scrutinize every word and every clause, but also to insure that
nothing was omitted which ought to be included. That, no doubt,
would be a very useful task, but was not what the committee had
been invited by :Mr. Root to do. The positive and constructive side
of ~lr. Root's proposal was to secure a clear understanding of the
standards of conduct which the public opinion of the world would
apply to future belligerents. That was the object of the document; that was what it set out to accomplish. He thought that
this end could best be achieved by transferring the words he had
quoted from paragraph two of section one to the preamble, which
\vould . then read as follows:
" The signatory powers desiring to make more effective the
rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives
of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war invite the
adherence of all other civilized powers to the following statement
of established law to the end that there may be a clear public.
understanding throughout the world of the ·standards of conduct
by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon
future belligerents."
This was a mere matter of arrangement, but he thought it
would help the world to see the great object which Mr. Root's
draft was intended to accomplish. He therefore welcomed the
procedure now proposed. The principles underlying this document had the warm approval of the British Empire delegation.
The members of that delegation ·w ould have preferred that the
document itself should have been rendered unnecessary by the
abolition of submarines. Since they had not been able to carry
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out this policy, however, 1Hr. Root's resolution provided them with
an alternative. If they could not hold their first line of defense,
they had at least a second line to fall back on, for in Mr. Root's
document the abuse of submarines had been unsparingly dealt
with. Everyone must recognize that when a weapon had been
misused in the past, could be n1isused in the future and would
be much more effective if so misused, no professions of morality
or declarations of law could be relied upon to supply a sure protection against this abuse. While all must regretfully admit this,
he would like to associate himself with what Mr. Root had said
yesterday about the immense advantage of embodying the plain
dictates of humanity in explicit terms. It was not sufficient for
them to be buried in works on international law or lost in departmental correspondence, they must be proclaimed in the most
public manner. He agreed with Mr. Root that, if so stated, they
could not and would not be without effect on the conduct of
· mankind. To suppose that submarines would never again be
abused, in spite of all the professions of the committee, would no
doubt be sanguine. But he believed that the adoption of these
resolutions would be a great step toward the education of the
world, and might do much to mitigate the horrors of war and
its needless cruelties. Holding these views, he could only congratulate lVIr. Root and promise his best support in the objects
which he sought to attain.
l\1r. Sarraut said that on two occasions already the French
delegation had joined with all its heart in the high spirit of
humanity which had inspired l\1r. Root's resolution. It congratulated itself also on having heard the discussion which had taken
place that morning and which had permitted everyone to grasp
his (l\1r. Root's) thought more fully, especially after the admirable comments which he had been good enough to make in his
splendid speech. If there were still people who doubted the necessity to condenjn the unmentionable abuses co1nmitted against
.humanity during the last war (and no one there present doubted
it) their uncertainty would have been eliminated by the convincing eloquence of their eminent colleague.
Once more, Mr. Sarraut continued, he brought the full and com
plete adherence of the French delegation to the sentiment expressed in the first motion of l\1r. Root, ±he principles of which
the French delegation accepted formally.
The French delegation did not want to stop with this adherence
to principle, but wanted to see the resolution go into force by
virtue of a definite text which would combine all the assents of
the Powers represented in the committee. Certain modifications
had been proposed. He was perfectly convinced that Mr. Root,
whose modesty equaled his great ability, would make no objection to the suggested amendments to his text. As a matter of
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procedure and in order to reach prompt results, it would be wise
if each of those who had made observations regarding the text
of l\fr. Root's resolution, or had suggested modifications of details, would take the trouble to prepare ·and communicate the
drafts which they proposed. These drafts could just as well
be discussed and the committee 'vould arrive in the end at a
general text which would combine, he hoped, the unanimity of
th~ir acceptances, and would then be clothed with an authority
such that, if ever-and all his hope repelled this idea-war
should again occur, the peoples would be bound by an agreementthe moral force of which would be borne in upon their consciences.
l\lr. Balfour appeared to apprehend that certain countries
might, in spite of everythiug, yield to the temptation to misuse
the weapons remaining in their hands. ~.,or his part he believed
that these peoples would reflect deeply before violating such obligations. If the committee had any doubt of this, if it could suppose that decisions such as those which were to be taken there
would not be carried out, debate would not be worth while, and
the only thing left for the committee would be to leave the table.
But 1\fr. Balfour himself had not entertained this pessimistic conclusion, since he had stated that a resolution invested with the
moral force of this decision would impress itself on the attention
of the worJd. One must not deduce from the abuses committed
by Germany the idea that inevitably others would commit the
same abuses.
It was just because the consciences of all present had revolted against these abuses; it was because their consciences
refused to accept the idea; it was because they were incapable
of acting likewise that their alliance became spontaneously so
strong against all those who had committed them.
He firmly believed in the influence that these joint decisions
might exercise over the world. The time n1ust come, as he· had
already stated, when they must call upon the other nations to
ratif;y their conclusions by approbation, thus giving them a uni\ersal and definite value. But it was precisely for that reason
and with that object that the text which would be the outcome
of their deliberations, strengthened by their unanimous approval,
should after mature consideration take on an emphatic and
authoritative forn:i which would impos~ itself upon the consent
of the whole civilized world.
The chairman then asked whether lt was desired to continue
the discussion of the first resolution. The suggestion had been
made that this resolution be adopted in principle, with reference
t o a subcommittee for the purpose of considering verbal suggestions which should be ln conformity with its obvious purpose.
25882-23--10
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Before that 'vas done, however, there should be an opportunity for
any destructive or constructive comments in. the committee that
might be of use to the subcommittee.
t~1r. San·aut said that if he understood the proceedings suggested it had now come to 'vhat in Fr.ench parliamentary language
was called " taking the matter under advisement"; that is to say,
keeping the resolution before the committee but referring it for
further consideration to a subcommittee.
The chairman said that that was his understanding of the proposal.
Senator Schanzer, on behalf of the Italian deletation, said that
'\
he could only reemphasize the most sincere and most cordial
sympathy with the idea and spirit of the resolution. The authority of Mr. Root was so great that the Italian delegation
could adhere to the first point to 'vhich l\1r. Balfour had referred, namely, the statement of the existing international law.
The second point put the Italian delegation in a some,vhat embarrassing position, as it had not received any instructions from
its Government. He, therefore, could not give unreserved adherence to this part of the resolutions. They did not wish to
delay the work of the committee, but felt they must make this
reservation.
The chairman then said that the question before the committee
was confi.ned to the first resolution, declaratory of the principles
of international la'v as it no'v exists.
He asked to be permitted to add a single word. Upon the adoption of this resolution in principle, it would be subject to such
verbal changes as might be thought best by the drafting committee. This resolution represented, the chairman thought, a
most emphatic condemnation of the abhorrent practices ·which had
been indulged in during the late war.
It would seem, indeed,
extraordinary if this conference, unn1indful of these abhorrent
practices 'vhich shockea the 'vorld and contributed more than
anything else to the defeat of the Imperial German Government,
should pass them unnoticed, and should deal only in a technical
spirit ·with the matters connected 'vith submarines.
There was another reason which made the declaration opportune and necessary. The committee had had a long discussion
in regard to the question of submarines, particularly as to the advisability of their continued use, their numbers, and as to the
practicability of their limitation. The 'committee had been unable
to reach an agreement on this question. That was a fact confronting them. Such a declaration as the one proposed in the
first resolution would go to the whole world as an indication that,
while the committee could not agree on such limitation, there was
no disagreement on the question that submarines should never.
he used contrary to the principles of law governing war. The
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adoption of the resolution might, furthermore, avc)id misunderstanding on the pa'~t of thos~ who were looking to the conference
with great hope. It certainly could not be considered as a vain
declaration after the experiences with submarines which the
powers there represented had had and the feelings engendered.
by those experiences, to declare in the most precise terms that the
rules of international law should be observed. He believed that
such a declaration would be of the greatest value.
He. hoped that when the resolution was referred to the drafting
committee, it would not be overlaid with lawyers' niceties. There
was, he knew, nothing which anyone could write which could not
be improved by lawyers, but when it came to the expression of
vague fears, to which lawyers so like to give expression, he hoped
t hat such verbal criticisms would receive scant attention. Anything genuine and direct which carried the real point, the world
wou'i«~ understand-such as the resolution proposed by Mr. Root.
Another important point was that the powers, should a difference arise between them, would have to remember that the
weapons which they possessed were not to be used as in the past
without reference to the laws of God and man. This would
greatly detract from the value of a submarine fleet, for when
nations counted their weapons they counted not only their number but the manner in which they could be used. Such a declaration would help the universal endeavors of diplomatists, charged
with the conduct of affairs to settle difficulties without strife, and
he hoped that the resolution would be agreed to with the understanding that, if it could be improved, it should be, but that the
principle was recognized and adopted as sound in substance.
Unless t9ere was objection, therefore, he. would put the first
resolution in this· form, i. e., that agreement was requested in
substance, with reference to a drafting committee (to consist of
a member designated by each delegation) to consider the form of
expression and such verbal changes as might be deemed advisable.
The chairman, after announcing the assent of the American
delegation to the first resolution, as amended by. Mr. Balfour, put
t he question to the other delegations, to~ which each assented
in turn.
The chairman therefore announced the unanimous adoption of
t he resolution and stated that he had asked Mr. Root to.. represent
the American delegation on the proposed committee and requested
that the other delegations should appoint their representatives so
that the matter could be referred to that committee for consideration of forms of expression.
The chairman then said that the second resolution would be
considered in the form presented as follows:
" The r-;ignatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of
u sin~ submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the
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requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, $:1Jld to the
end that the prohibition- of such use shall be universally acceptecl
as a part of the law of nations they declare their assent to such
prohibition and invite all other nations to adhere thereto/'
As Mr. Root had explained, this· was a proposition to change
the law. The first resolution attempted to stat~ the law, the law
which had been ignored and which had been trampled under foot,
but which nevertheless had been and still was regarded as international law. This _resolution fundamentally recognized, however, the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce
destroyers without ·violating the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of neutrals and noncombatants. He assumed the resolution to mean that, while the
rules of war were as stated in the first resolution-at least in
substance~and \Vhile it was the sense of the powers there represented that they should be adhered to and clearly understood~
the civilized world should be asked to outlaw the submarine as a
weapon against commerce.
The point had been made that morning that there might be a
question in regard to the assent of the powers here represented to
the prohibition, i. e., in relation to the last words of the resolution, which provided that the po\vers here represented were to
invite all otber nations to adhere. He_supposed that this meant
that, if the prohibition should receive' the assent of the powers
here represented, they adopted it in the hope that it would be made
a part of international law upon the adherence of ali" the other
powers-not that it would become binding upon the powers here
represented, if it did not become a part of international law, and
if others by their refusal to assent prevented it~ from becoming a
general principle. He assumed that the intention of the resolu~
tion was not that these powers should try to make international
law for themselves, ·which, of course, they could not do, but that
they should use their influence to obtain the adherence of nation~
to a new rule of law outlawing the submarine as a destroyer of
commerce.
Mr. Root said the diairman had correctly stated the sense of
the closing words of the resolution; it \vas to the end that the
prohibition of the use of submarines should be universally accepted. Two things were done in the resolutions. First, a declaration was made, then ·an assertion. If a single nation were!
to lead with such a proposal, it might have no effect. It required
universal assent to establish a law of nations. There was a
difference between the second and the first resolutions. The
first was a declaration of existing law and created nothing,
merely certifying to what existed. The second resolution called
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for an act \Vhich did not take effect until assent had been received.
1\lr. Balfour said he would like to make a suggestion to Mr.
Root. He understood Mr. Root's view to be that the powers
represented on this committee were only endeavoring to initiate a
great reform of international law, by declaring their own view and
pledging themselves to induce other nations if possible to support it. He desired to ask whether he could not go a little further.
'Vhy should not the five nations represented here agree between
themselves to act on the rule which Mr. Root proposed? This
suggestion was not inconsistent with Mr. Root's plan. On the
contrary it would greatly promote it. Nothing could be better
as an example than that the five states, instead of merely adopting a resolution which would be inoperative till generally adopted,
should adopt immediately the principles which they desired eventually to see embodied in international law. He did not wish to
dogmatize on the subject, but he wished to put the proposal before l\lr. Root for his consideration.
l\lr. Root said that he would illustrate: The United States had
the practice of amending the Constitution. The Constitution
could be amended by a proposal of Congress and the assent of
three-quarters of the States. One State voted, another, then another, then another-their votes were of no consequence whatever unless and until the necessary number had been recordedand only when the assent of the necessary number had been recorded could they become effective. The committee could not
make a rule of international law; all that they could do was to
propose a law, and in proposing it they might add to it their assent, which did not become a law until the necessary number of
assents had been received to make it a rule of law. He said that
a great mass of nations agreeing might make international law,
but the general rule was that international law requires universal acceptance.
He observed, speaking for himself and \Vithout opportunity to
consult the other members of the American delegation, or without intending to speak for them, that it would be entirely satisfactory as far as he was concerned to have such an addition to
this second prohibition as Mr. Balfour had suggested. It was an
addition providing for the five powers who were here and who
would be bound by such a prohibition as between each other, and
he observed fhat he was quite sure that every power at the conference intended to shape its conduct in accordance with the
rule proposed. Such an intention would make for security and
good und'erstan ding.
l\Ir. Hoot said he did not suppose that such a course would. in
any degree change the conduct of any power here. but an assur-
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ance of an intention respecting that conduct would be of great
value in settling this disturbed and distracted world.
· Mr. Balfour had asked a question as to policy. Mr. Root · said
he would give this point but passing notice. It was a very common thing in the legislation of all of their countries to deal with
objectionable practices by broad prohibitions, because broad and
simple prohibitions could be enforced, while complicated prohibitions filled with many items were exceedingly difficult to enforce. He supposed thaf a very broad prohibition like that we
now live under here was necessary in order to make a simple
rule which would prevent people from doing things in an objectionable way. In this case if they tried to make the prohibitions in detail, it would be impossible to enforce them, just as
it 'vas now impossible in the United States to have a glass of
wine at dinner because it was necessary to have a broad prohibition to prevent a lot of poor fellows from getting drunk on
bad whisky. This was a proposal of the same character as the
proposal made by the British delegation, which had not been
received with favor, i. e., the proposal to ban all submarines, with
a broad prohibition based upon the fact that though submarines
may have a useful purpose, nevertheless the painful purposes to
which they might be put \vere so serious and so injurious that
they justified the establish1nent of a broad and simple prohibition
of all submarines. If you undertook to deal with submarines in
detail you failed. You could not make a prohibition that could
be enforced. Therefore the abuses were so great that the world
would be 'vise to ban them altogether. Now this was a proposal
the same in character, resting upon the same consid~rations; that
is to say, it saved the submarine for legitimate purposes and
banned only the injurious use of submarines. It substituted a
general prohibition for a detailed prohibition-the rule which
they had just recognized in their action upon the first resolution,
and the wisdom of which did not rest upon theory. It rested in
their memory of the most painful events of recent times.
When the German submarines began torpedoing innocent merchant ships and when they had stopped them for the purpose of
visit and search and had begun to place bombs in the hulls and
blow up vessels, indignant protests \Vere made. The German
answer was that it was impossible to comply with the rules that
had been made to govern the actions of surface ships. There was
an agreernent upon that. German·y declared it to be impossible,
and it was impossible. The submarines could not successfully
carry on warfare against merchant ships and summon them in
the ordinary way to stop for visit and search. And when a v-essel
had been stopped for visit and search, the submarine could not
put its crew and passengers in safety becavse the work was
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done while the submarine itself was in a uauger from which it
could escape only by swift submersion. The submarine · could
not take a great boat load of passengers and crew into its interior,
where air had to be furnished urtificiuUy. The distressing circumstances of the crew. and passengers of merchant ships deemed
the prey of submarines and left to die, were obvious. Germany's
assertion that it was impossible for the submarine to war on
merchant ships in accordance with these· rules was well founded,
a·nd for one, the Government of the United States assented to it,
agreed to it, admitted it. But they said the consequence was not
that the rule failed, but that such warfare must end.
There was no fact nwre finnly established than that all the
temptations that beset a belligerent to gain its point at whatever
cost 'vould stand between the submarines and conformity with
civilized procedure. The only way to secure the safety of innocent
passengers and crews, noncombatants, neutrals, women, children,
etc.-the only way to secure their safety was to say, that no belligerent should attack a merchant ship through an instrumentaiity
which can not achieve the attack without violating the rule. It
created a simple and forcible rule in the place of the complicated
and detailed rules which were required by the weakness of human
nature. Mr. Root said a forcible rule, because a rule that could
be understood by the people. He repeated again with regard to
what he had said before regarding the first resolution, that he
granted that contracts between nations would not enforce themselves. He granted that the rules made by diplomatists, conferences, and foreign offices, might not be enforced. But he also
asserted that when ·a rule is bas~d upon the principles of
humanity and when the public of all free countries had got hold
of it, understood it, and adopted it as a guide in its conduct of
belligerent operations, the public opinion of all civilized countries
would furnish sufficient support of the rule-because the condemnation of the public of the world brings with it a condign
punishment for any Nation that offends, a punishment that no
Nation dares to face.
The chairman said that there were two distinct propositions
before the committee. The first, broadly stated, was an attempt to
amend and improve existing international law in the sense that
submarines should not be used at all as destroyers of commerce.
There might be some difficulty in determining definitely when
international law had actually been amended, but he believed that
some means could probably be found of establishing a criterion,
as for example, by stating that the agreement should be effective
on the adherence of powers named.
The other proposal, which had been made by Mr. Balfour and
accepted by Mr. Root, was that, regardless of the outcome of the
first proposal, the five powers represented on the committee should
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bind themselves, as among themselves, not to use the submarine
for the destruction of commerce. Quite apart from any attempt
the committee might desire to make to change international law,
such a proposition was entirely within the competency of the
powers here represented. So far as the American delegates were
concerned, there was no doubt as to the approval of the policy.
It 'vas really a practical application of existing rules, as it was
only in exceptional cases that submarines could operate successfully against commerce and the existence of the exceptional
cases constituted an invitation and temptation to violation of the
law. On this point it ·was hoped agreement could be reached.
The t'vo propositions, while distinct, could be set forth in one
declaration or in separate declarations. The chairman desired
to know whether such discussion should take P.lace then or
should be postponed until the following day.
~lr. Balfour said that the chairman had pointed out that the
discussion had brought two propositions before us: First, the
change in international la·w proposed in Article II of Mr. Root's
resolutions, and second, the addition which he himself had suggested in that resolution 'vhereby the powers represented on this
committee ·would bind thems~lves immediately to accept and act
·upon the new policy as b.etween themselves. He thought it ·would
assist the consideration of this question if he were to give the
exact words in ·which his own proposal should be formulated.
·He would amend the last part of Article II so as to read as
follows:
"They declare their assent to such prohibition and they agree
to be bound forthwith thereby as between themselves, and they
invite all other nations to adhere to the present agreement."
The subcommittee for drafting a resolution regarding submarines ·was made up as follows: United States, l\fr. Root; British
Empire, Sir Auckland Geddes; France, Vice Admiral de Bon,
Mr. Kammerer; Italy, Signor Ricci; Japan, Mr. Hanihara.
The meeting then adjourned until 11 o'clock a. m., December 30,
1921.
THIRTEENTH MEETING-FRIDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1921, 11 A. M.
PRESENT.

United States.-Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, l\fr. Root, Senator
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Ac~ompanied by
~1r. Wright, Mr. Clark.
British Empire.-Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Senator Pearce (for Australia),
Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), l\fr. Sastri (for India).

